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CONSTRUCTIONS OF CLIENT COMPETENCE AND
THEORIES OF PRACTICE
Robert Rubinson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The prevailing model of how lawyers should interact with clients-usually
called "client-centered lawyering"l-holds that attorneys should submerge
their own perspectives into those of their clients. Although conceptions of
client-centered lawyering are far from monolithic, they do tend to assume an
authentic client "text" or "voice" that a lawyer can, while remaining as
neutral as possible, transform into legal discourse fit for judges and other
actors in the legal process. 2 Thus, attorneys can and should avoid individual
value judgments which influence-and thereby taint-their clients' texts.
However, attorney/client interactions also reflect the tensions and
complexities that arise in all social interactions. 3 As social actors, both

•
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions of Barbara A. Babb, Peggy C. Davis, Leslie
Feiner, Martin A. Geer, Cheri Wyron Levin, Robert L. Levy, Jane C. Murphy. and the
participants of the Mid-Atlantic Clinical Theory Workshop, at which I presented an earlier draft of
this paper. The author also thanks Elizabeth Butler-Witter, Irina Azer, and Sara Litzky for their
research assistance. The author is especially grateful to Randi E. Schwanz for her insights and
encouragement.
1.
See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (1991). This book is a revision of David Binder and Susan C. Price's influential text,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
2.
See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 19-21; Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as
Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1298, 1299-1300 (1992); Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 697, 708-710 (1992); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice
and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.l. 861, 945 (1992).
3.
See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on
Scholarship in the Post-Modem, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1103 (1994). For
especially compelling demonstrations of the complexities and contingencies of legal representation,
see William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992); Gerald P. Lopez,
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Ufe of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO.
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attorneys and clients internalize assumptions about themselves and each other
which then, as negotiated through discourse, produce a fluid, dynamic set of
meanings. 4 This broader context reveals that operative concepts in practice
theory-"client voice," "client autonomy," and "attorney neutrality"-tend
to obscure important dimensions of experience. s
My general method in exploring these issues is to go from the specific to
the general. I will examine in detail how one assumption about one class of
clients-the assumption that the elderly inevitably experience a progressive
decline in competence-influences how attorneys perceive elderly clients and
how elderly clients perceive themselves. The elderly are a particularly
compelling group of clients for such an investigation. Popular culture is rife
with unexamined and legitimized stereotypes about aging and the elderly.
The very pervasiveness of these stereotypes renders them largely invisible.
Because this is a relatively neglected area in legal scholarship and in political
discourse, the discovery that these stereotypes are not a "real" description of
the world is shocking. Thus, an examination of elderly clients is a
particularly rich vehicle for exploring the implications that these stereotypes
have for representing elderly clients, and also for analyzing how well
practice theory describes the complex operation of social constructions at
play in all attorney/client interactions.
The first section of the article reviews the literature on counseling elderly
clients, and the recent emergence of models invoking "context" as the
touchstone for representing such clients.
Although valuable in
conceptualizing how attorneys should approach these clients, these models
tend to neglect the profound impact of stereotypes about the elderly and
assumptions about the relationship between aging and competence. The
second section defines the "idea of decrement"-the assumption that aging
inevitably entails a progressive decline in cognitive function. The third
section explores how this assumption leads attorneys to interpret much of
what elderly clients say and do as the product of cognitive impairment, and
sometimes leads elderly clients themselves to construct stories about the
world, themselves, and their circumstances in line with the idea of
LJ. 1603 (1989); Jane M. Spinak. Reflections on a Case (Of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1990 (1995).
4.
See infra text accompanying notes 58-137.
5.
See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 221 (1980) ("any
consistent set of metaphors will most likely hide indefinitely many aspects of reality-aspects that
can be highlighted only by other metaphors that are inconsistent with it"); Lucie E. White, Seeking
• . . . The Faces of Otherness . .. n: A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner. and Cohn, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1509 (1992) (recognizing the need for "multiple theoretical lenses, lenses
which focus on institutions, on moments of recognition, as well as on the ebbs and flows of
interpersonal power").
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decrement. The fourth section explores what happens when the two
perspectives of attorney and client-informed by the idea of decrement yet
drawn apart by it as well-interact in complex ways. Finally, the fifth
section explores the consequences of this analysis for client-centered
lawyering. While the critical message of client-centered lawyering-the
centrality of client perspectives-remains valid and of extraordinary
importance to teachers and practitioners, the analysis of how attorneys and
elderly clients interact raises questions about the idea that attorneys should
remain "neutral" as they seek to unveil an "authentic" client voice free of
attorney influence. Rather, legal representation can be conceptualized as a
dynamic attempt to construct meaning, and this conceptualization has
important advantages for both attorneys and clients.

II. CONSTRUCTIONS OF COMPETENCE

A. "There" or "Not All There"
Prior to becoming a law school teacher, I was an attorney in a civil Legal
Aid office that represented elderly people. My clients manifested a broad
continuum of competence. Some were plainly "not all there" and appeared
obviously incompetent. For example, one client would laugh uproariously at
private jokes and fail to remember me even if I had visited him the previous
day.6 His psychiatrist cited such "inappropriate jocularity" as a prime
manifestation of his senile dementia. After meeting with this client many
times, I concluded that he did indeed have some cognitive impairment.
Nevertheless, to my surprise, he could also, after a great deal of effort on
my part, engage in meaningful conversation. He was also a wonderfully
exuberant character whom I grew to like.
Other clients appeared to present much closer questions. One ninety-plus
client was nearly deaf. In order to be heard, I found myself raising my voice
in the exaggerated simplicity and intonation that many adopt when speaking
to children.
He called me constantly, and his quivering voice was
extraordinarily difficult to understand. What I was able to hear, however,
seemed to make sense. Surprisingly so, I thought, for someone of such
advanced years.

6.
In this and in succeeding descriptions of clients, I have eliminated identifying factual
details in order to preserve cl ient confidentiality.
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In another case, a client in her late eighties was embroiled in a longstanding dispute with her landlord. After trying for months to determine
why she was not receiving a pension to which she was entitled, I began to
suspect strongly that her son was taking the benefits for himself-an example
of one particularly pervasive form of elder abuse. 7 When I asked her about
it, she seemed remarkably serene, and simply said I should speak to herson
about it; her son, she told me, handled all her finances. My initial reaction
was that she was old and could not assimilate the awful truth that her son
was taking advantage of her. Although the case was taken over by a new
attorney after I left Legal Aid, I have thought about the case for some time,
and I have come to suspect-although I can never be sure-that she knew
exactly what was going on, and was perfectly at ease with it.
Needless to say, I encountered many clients who were surprisingly "all
there." I would view such clients who were over eighty as especially
remarkable for their age. 8
In all of these cases, I WOUld, of course, seek to understand my clients'
circumstances and goals and try to implement them. For clients who
appeared to be marginally competent, I would, to the extent possible, try not
to impose my own ideas about what was best for the client. When a client
whom I perceived to be obviously incompetent was involved in litigation, I
would dutifully move for appointment of a guardian ad litem. 9 Whatever the
circumstances of a particular case, however, I found myself freely offering
advice to elderly clients, and, on occasion, actively persuading them to
follow it. In my mind, this advice-giving was motivated by compassion and
a recognition of the extraordinary vulnerability of the elderly.
In fact, my reactions to these clients were suffused with assumptions
about the elderly and the aging process. I drew inferences from the age and
characteristics of these clients, and these inferences-described more fully
belowlO-in turn influenced how I viewed the client and the client's problems
and thus, ultimately, how I approached the representation.

7.
See. e.g .. Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics
and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609,628 (1990).
8.
Many studies of the elderly draw distinctions among the "young old" and the "old old."
For example, the World Health Organization describes those people ages 60-75 as "elderly," those
76-90 as "old," and those over 90 as "very old." ALEXANDER P. SPENCE, THE BIOLOGY OF
HUMAN AGING 7 (1995).
9.
As a New York practitioner, I was governed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202 (McKinney 1994).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 39-86.
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B. Traditional Approaches to Competence
There is virtually no legal literature on how attorneys and the elderly
construct their conceptions of competence and how these play out in
attorney/client interactions. 11 There is, however, a considerable body of
literature about the appropriate analysis attorneys should apply in
determining how best to counsel clients assuming that they are of
"questionable competence." This literature sets the context for exploring
from a different perspective the patterns that emerge when attorneys construe
the competence of elderly clients.
Traditional approaches to competence assume that competence is
determinate and discoverable. As such, "competence" forms an important
link in the "agency" conception of legal representation. 12 Thus, if the
client/principal lacks competence, the attorney/agent lacks authority to act on
the client/principal's behalf, thus nullifying an attorney's authority to
represent a client. 13
However, this approach is fraught with difficulties. A primary problem
is the lack of a meaningful definition of competence. 14 The legal concept of
"competence" is an either/or proposition: either you have it or you don't.
At first blush, this approach seems reasonable enough given that
"competence" has an air of scientific precision. However, psychiatrists do
not agree:
11. Although not focusing on attorney/client interactions, one recent article does examine
how prejudice against the elderly plays out in courts and legislatures. See Linda S. Whitton,
Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices- What's
an Attorney To Do: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101,
1133 (1994); see also Pioneer Inv. Servo Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 396 (1993)
(describing attorney as acting as client's agent).
13. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 404 (1996)
("principles of agency law might operate to suspend or terminate the lawyer's authority to act when
a client becomes incompetent"). For an elaboration of ethical issues in representing clients with
diminished competence through traditional agency principles, see James R. Devine, The Ethics of
Representing The Disabled Client: Does Model Rule 1.14 Adequately Resolve The Best
Interests/Advocacy Dilemma?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 493 (1984).
14. See William E. Adams & Rebecca C. Morgan, Representing the Client Who Is Older in
the Law Office and the Counroom, 2 ELDER L.J. I, 17-22 (1994); Herr, supra note 7, at 617-18.
Indeed, typical legal formulations tend toward the tautological, such as the widely used definition of
"incapacitated person" from the Uniform Probate Code: "[A person] impaired by reason of mental
illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability ... or other cause (except minority) to the
extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-103(7), 8 U.L.A. 327 (1988). See also Bobbe Shapiro
Nolan, Functional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 212, 217-21 (Marshall B. Kapp et al. eds. 1986)
(classifying statutory definitions of incompetence and incapacity).
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The law has tended to address competency as a fixed attribute of an
individual, a characteristic in itself with an inherent stability. The
clinician, on the other hand, knows that what the law calls
competency is, in fact, a set of deductions from a variety of
clinical data that can be as subject to influence and change as 'the
more basic mental attributes on which it is based. 15

The fluidity of competence is both a clinical and a philosophical
conclusion. The commonplace conception of "competence" presupposes that
"competence" has an essence and that this essence is static, definable, and
discoverable. ,However, there are a vast array of diminished mental
capacities which vary not only from person to person, but within individuals
depending on, among other things, the subject matter at issue, the time of
day, and/or the person or persons interacting with the purportedly
incompetent person. 16 In other words, inquiries concerning competence are
intensely contextual and thus not susceptible to a "one size fits all"
definition. 17 Given such a conceptual morass, many commentators have
given up. Indeed, one has despairingly noted that issues of competence are
"the black hole of legal ethics. ,,18

15. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency,
138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1466 (1981); see also Rein, supra note 12, at 1120-25.
16. See Terrie Todd Wetle, Ethical Aspects of Decision Making For and With the Elderly, in
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 258,264 (Marshall B. Kapp
et al. eds., 1986); Gerald K. Goodenough, The Lack of Objectivity of Physician Evaluations in
Geriatric Guardianship Cases, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 53, 55-56 (1988).
17. This issue implicates a broader philosophical debate about essentialism.
For an
interesting discussion of this issue, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA:
EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 201-202 (1995).
18. Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing
Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1082 (1994). The rules of
ethics themselves offer little meaningful guidance on how attorneys should approach whether or not
a client is competent. As has been addressed in depth elsewhere, the Model Rules, at bottom,
merely highlight potential ethical pitfalls without offering a sense of what factors or facts are
relevant in reaching appropriate decisions about whether a client is competent. See Herr, supra note
7, at 615-20. The Model Rules, however, unlike the older Model Code, at least do recognize
"intermediate degrees of competence" and encourage lawyers "as far as reasonably possible, [tol
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship" with an impaired client.
MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. (1996); see also David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A
Borrowed Paradigmfor Crisper Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 163, 186 (1997).
It is interesting to note the distinction between the issue of capacity and other terms in the lawsuch as the "reasonable person" standard in tort law-which are classically difficult to define.
Absent precise definition by courts or legislatures, any detinition of "reasonable person" necessarily
entails an exploration of what such a person would do "under the circumstances of the particular
case"-in other words, in context. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. d (emphasis
added). In contrast, the classic view holds that capacity operates independently of context.
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There is yet another difficulty with the traditional agency approach to
competence. If the principal/agency relationship breaks down, the law
provides an alternative: guardianship. However, many observers take a dim
view of guardianship for at least two reasons. 19 First, there is no reason to
believe that judges are in a better position than anyone else to reach
principled decisions about a fluid legal fiction like "competence. ,,20 Second,
given inadequate judicial oversight subsequent to the appointment of a
guardian, the alleged incompetent person might be subject to the whims of
unscrupulous guardians or conservators.21
In light of these conceptual and practical considerations, most
practitioners and scholars now conclude that although it is not necessarily a
good idea for attorneys to err on the side of representing clients of
questionable competence-what the Model Rules call "de facto
guardianship,,22-it is a worse idea to turn to guardianship.23 A third
alternative-declining or withdrawing from representation-might, of course,
be available but unattractive; these clients are often in deep trouble with few
or no allies, and declining or withdrawing from representation solves the
lawyer's dilemma at the cost of leaving vulnerable individuals
unrepresented. 24 Thus there is a general presumption in practice, and
increasingly in theory, in favor of representing a questionably competent
client without going through the elaborate procedures required for a formal
appointment of a guardian or other substitute decision-maker.

19. See Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu LAwyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1429, 1436 (1994); see also Herr, supra note 7, at 623 (noting that "guardianship has been
criticized as outmoded, overused, and harmful").
20. See Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: LAwyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 562-563. Indeed, even though there is a
legal presumption in favor of a finding of competence, see STANLEY S. HERR ET AL., LEGAL
RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 23 (1983), judges tend to grant guardianship petitions in cases
involving the elderly in overwhelming numbers. See Arnold 1. Rosoff & Gary L. Gottlieb,
Preserving Personal Autonomy for the Elderly: Competency, Guardianship, and Alzheimer's
Disease, 8 1. LEGAL MED. I, 16 (1986). Tremblay speculates that judges do so because the
appointment of a guardian is safer; after all, denial of the appointment might risk "unpaid bills. lack
of food and heat, and eviction or foreclosure." Tremblay, supra at 562-63.
21. See. e.g., Tremblay, supra note 20, at 565.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. 2 (1996).
23. Indeed, a leading commentator on these issues, Paul R. Tremblay, has acknowledged that
he no longer disapproves of the notion of attorneys acting as "de facto" guardians. See Tremblay,
supra note 19, at 1436 n.25.
24. See Margulies, supra note 18, at 1076-77 (noting the "duty to maximize the availability
of legal services" to "challenged seniors"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 404 (1996) (stating that while solving the "lawyer's dilemma," withdrawal "may leave
the impaired client without help at a time when the client needs it most").
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Given that attorneys frequently will represent a client of questionable
competence without seeking a guardian, issues of how an attorney should
counsel and interact with such clients become highly significant. These
issues are characteristically framed in terms of a debate between those who
hold that an attorney's role is to advocate on behalf of what a client wants (a
view that values a client's "autonomy" above all else), and those who
believe that an attorney has a role in actively determining what is in the "best
interests" of the client. 25 This debate assumes that lawyers have two choices:
1) an attorney should at most facilitate the client in making an educated,
"autonomous" choice; or 2) an attorney should reach decisions based upon
what the attorney paternalistically believes to be in the "best interests" of the
client even if inconsistent with the stated views of the client. 26
However, some have argued that autonomy and paternalism may reduce
to the same thing: both valorize what is, in the attorney's view, best for the
client. 27 Thus, attorneys who adopt the "autonomy" view inevitably shade
the nature of their advice by choosing the content, style, and order of their
presentation based upon their judgment as to what is important for the client
to knoW. 28 Attorneys who adopt a paternalistic or "best interests" stance
seek to determine what is in the client's "best interests" based upon their
knowledge of the client and their own sense of what a client would ordinarily
want under the circumstances. 29 Although this distinction may reflect
important differences in emphasis, these "concepts are far more slippery and
intertwined than the more categorical treatment has implied, and . . .
relationships are far too complicated and contextual to allocate decisionmaking power easily in one camp or the other. ,,30

25. Practitioners and scholars who represent children wrestle with analogous questions. See,
e.g., Manin Guggenheim. The Right To Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.V. L. REV. 76 (1984); lean Koh Peters, The Roles and
Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed lAwyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505 (1996); Spinak, supra note 3, at 2005.
26. See PETER 1. STRAUSS ET AL., AGING AND THE LAW 14-15 (1990). For a leading anicle
on formulating a conception of paternalism, see David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal
Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454.
27. See William H. Simon, lAwyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD.
L. REV. 213,222-26 (1991); see also Tremblay, supra note 19, at 1442.
28. See Simon, supra note 27, at 217-18.
29. See id.
30. Tremblay, supra note 19, at 1442. See also Herr, supra note 7, at 618 ("there are
tremendous obstacles to constructing coherent attorney roles in even narrow contexts" among
"disabled" populations). But see Mark Spiegel. The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and
Autonomy in lAwyer-Client Counseling, 94 BYV L. REV. 307 (1997) (arguing that theoretical
distinctions remain between paternalism and autonomy).
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C. The Contextual Turn

The result of these debates has been a recent turn away frorn the dualities
of "cornpetence" /"incornpetence" and "autonorny" /"best interests" towards
"contextual" and "situational" analyses. 31 For example, Jan Ellen Rein
proposes to rnove "beyond the cornpetency construct" by expanding the
factors attorneys should consider when determining whether to rnake
decisions on behalf of questionably competent clients.32 Rein argues that
while attorneys should ordinarily and unequivocally take direction from their
clients about the course of representation, there is an exception:
"interference with individual decision-making is warranted . . . to protect
third party or societal interests when, in the particular situation, they are of
higher social irnportance than untrammeled decision-rnaking itself. ,,33 Peter
Margulies offers an alternative conception of how attorneys should approach
representing the elderly of questionable capacity. 34 Margulies argues that
attorneys faced with such clients should consider how to rnaxirnize the "core
values" of providing access to legal services, fostering connection arnong the
elderly by representing groups cornprised of the elderly, and letting "the
client's voice be heard. ,,35
Both Rein and Margulies thus ernbrace a rnore "situational" and
"contextual" approach.
In so doing, they reject the over-simplified
dichotomies of competence/incompetence and autonornylbest interests. In its
place, they propose a series of factors that lawyers should consider when
representing clients of questionable competence.
31. These movements toward context reflect broader trends. For example, some recent
clinical literature has argued that attorneys need to examine the subtleties of a client's context-both
individual and social-while rejecting more universal, abstract conceptions of attorney/client
interactions. See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 719; Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives,
Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV.
901,909,936 (1997); Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1731, 1739-40 (1993) [hereinafter Constructions of the Client]; Ann Shalleck, Theory and
Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between the lAwyer and Client: Representing Women
Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1039 n.97 (1997) [hereinafter Theory and
Experience]. Such trends, in turn, echo the importance of "context" in other realms of legal
scholarship and in philosophical currents such as pragmatism and postmodernism. See, e.g., Phyllis
Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43
HASTINGS LJ. 717, 739-47 (1992); Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1597 (1990).
32. See Rein, supra note 12, at 1162-75.
33. Id. at 1165. This perspective resonates with feminist crlttques of the concept of
"autonomy" when a client'S autonomy interferes with the autonomy of unrepresented individuals or
groups. See Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39,48-49
(1994).
34. See Margulies, supra note 18.
35. Id. at 1076-80.
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Margulies' access, connection and voice, and Rein's autonomy and social
interests furnish important categories for analysis. However, setting aside
questions about the value of their particular analyses and those of othersquestions that tend to dominate the academic discourse in this area-an
important question remains regardless of which factors one chooses: how do
people go about constructing the meaning that gets plugged into these
factors? For example, how do we construe, under Rein's analysis, a client's
"untrammeled decision making" or, under Margulies' analysis, what "the
client's voice" is? After all, a central insight of clinical theory is that
underlying facts and the ends and means of representation are not pieces of
data prepackaged for examination, but are constructed by attorneys and
clients. 36 Moreover, this construction inevitably involves building upon
assumptions about how the world works. If it were otherwise, life would be,
in William James' phrase, "a bloomin' buzzin' confusion. ,,37
A great deal of important work in a variety of disciplines. has explored the
critical issues surrounding such "construction of meaning. ,,38 Social
psychologists, for example, have demonstrated that human beings are
"cognitive conservatives," that is, our minds tend to interpret facts to be
consistent with what we already believe, and these interpretations are often
guided by assumptions and stereotypes. 39 Legal commentators have also

36. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614-15 (1984).
37. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 113 (1970) (quoting
William James). Stanley Fish has articulated this idea in another way: "To imagine a world with no
background in place, with no prearticulation of the directions one might take, is to imagine a world
where there would be literally nowhere to go, where, since every path would be the same path, the
notion of doing this rather than that-of acting freely-would be empty." STANLEY FISH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY
AND LEGAL STUDIES, 459 (1989). The preeminent proponent of this view in the Western
philosophical tradition is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who called such assumptions "forms of life."
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 85,217 (1958).
38. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 4 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
39. For example, through "confirmation bias," humans "manage knowledge in a variety of
ways to promote the selective availability of information that confirms judgments already arrived
at." Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History,
35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603, 606 (1980). Through "biased hypothesis testing," we subject evidence
supporting hypotheses with which we do not agree to greater scrutiny than evidence supporting
hypotheses with which we do agree. See, e.g., Lord et aI., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective
Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1232 (1984). For a
review of the different processes that social psychologists have identified as contributing to these
tendencies, see Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Counroom: Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial
Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 27-29 (1996). For influential inquiries that explore the
construction of meaning in other disciplines, see generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973) (anthropology); MIKHAIL BAKHTlN, THE DIALOGIC
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explored how stock stories and stereotypes often control the construction of
and justification for ostensibly "neutral" legal principles. 40
The next three parts of this article investigate how a single, pervasive
assumption about the elderly-the idea of decrement-exerts a profound
influence on how attorneys and the elderly construe competence and
communicate with each other.

III. THE IDEA OF DECREMENT
Assumptions abound about the elderly. Many are negative: for example,
the elderly are grouchy, unsociable, and sexually inactive. 41 Some are more
"positive": for example, the elderly are more "experienced" and better
storytellers. 42 However, one assumption about the elderly is espeCially
preeminent: aging entails a "progressive decline in health or competence. ,,43
This view conceptualizes health and competence as an "inverted U" over
time, with a steadily increasing level of competence from childhood until
adulthood, with a steadily decreasing level thereafter until reaching, once
again, a level comparable to that of a child. 44 This is "the idea of
decrement. ,,45
IMAGINATION (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981) (literary
theory); WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 37 (philosophy).
40. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 7
(1993); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 10 (1987); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from
Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688 (1998).
41. See NIKOLAS COUPLAND ET AL., LANGUAGE, SOCIETY AND THE ELDERLY 133 (1991).
42. See MICHAEL W. PRATT & JOAN E. NORRIS, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AGING 87
(1994).
43. COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 3. This focus also tends to dominate empirical
research about the elderly. See id. at 7-8.
44. Id. at 12.
45. I have chosen to use the terminology adopted by COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41.
Although not always called "decrement," this stereotype is often described in the literature on aging
and gerontology. See, e.g., Carroll L. Estes, The Aging Enterprise Revisited, 33 GERONTOLOGIST
292, 292 (1993) (a social "construction of reality is that the aging process is one of biological,
physiological, and cognitive decline"); H.B. GIBSON, THE EMOTIONAL AND SEXUAL LIVES OF
OLDER PEOPLE 55 (1992) ("The stereotype that younger people, both professional and lay, have of
aging includes a false model of deterioration over time. "); George Banziger & Jean Drevenstedt,

Achievement Attributions by Young and Old Judges as a Function of Perceived Age of Stimulus
Person, 37 J. GERONTOLOGY 468, 468 (1982) ("stereotypically . . . old age [is] associated with a
perceived diminution of competency"); Marie R. Haug & Marcia G. Dry, Issues in Elderly PatientProvider Interactions, 9 RES. ON AGING 3, 6 (1987) (noting social stereotype which "Iump[s] all
those 65 and over into one category and characteriz[es] all older people as in declining or ill health .
. . and doomed to senility"). Even Shakespeare's Dogberry notes in MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING,
act 3, sc. 5, that "[w]hen the age is in, the wit is out."
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The pervasiveness of the idea of decrement is extraordinary. It surfaces
in popular culture, such as jokes and birthday cards which invoke the
decremental effects of aging. 46 It arises in categories that link age with
physical or cognitive challenges: Medicare, for example, is called "Health
Insurance for Aged and Disabled, ,,47. and Social Security is called "Income
for Aged, Blind, and Disabled. ,,48 Binder, Bergman and Price construct a
similar category by devoting a portion of a chapter on "atypical and difficult
clients" to "communicating with aged and infirm clients. ,,49
This idea of decrement also controls discourse with and about the elderly.
For example, a statement such as "my grandmother is eighty-six, but she's
still sharp as a tack" embodies a norm of decrement: the relationship
between the two variables underlying the statement-age and mental
competence-would not be significant unless most eighty-six-year-olds were
not believed to be "sharp as a tack. "so Such statements that confirm how
"with it" an elderly person is reaffirm the norm.
Moreover, as elaborated in more detail below, SI the idea of decrement
operates with particular force when an elderly person does not exhibit
specific behavior that undermines age-related stereotypes. For example, the
"sharp as a tack" eighty-six year old will likely be judged favorably as
"remarkable for her age," but a "normal" eighty-six year old wiIllikely be
judged to be consistent with the full range of assumptions underlying the idea
of decrement. S2
46. See GIBSON, supra note 45, at 73; Iudith Rodin & Ellen Langer, Aging Labels: The
Decline of Control and the Fall of Self-Esteem, I. SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1980, at 12, 13.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1991).
48. Id. § 1381. Linking together these three groups reveals other stereotypes, such as the
blind not being "fully able." Surveys have also found that many state statutes link age with
incompetence or infirmity. See Whitton, supra note 11, at 477-78. It has been argued that the very
existence of such "age-segregated categorical services" fosters the perception thaI aging is a uniform
"problem" that requires governmental intervention. See Estes, supra note 45, at 292.
49. BINDER ET AL., supra nOle I, at 245. Although including the caveat that "not every older
person will have difficulty recalling and conveying information," the thrust of the section is that
"[cJommon barriers to satisfactory communication include advanced age and medical intirmity."
[d.
50. The impact of the norm of decrement on discourse will be addressed in more detail in
Part V. See infra text accompanying notes 117-146.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
52. See Ellen Bouchard Ryan & Rochelle L. Cole, Evaluative Perceptions of Interpersonal
Communication with Elders, in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY 172, 177 (Howard
Giles et at. eds., 1990). For a theoretical discussion of the possible operation of this process, see
V.A. Braithwaite, Old Age Stereotypes: Reconciling Contradictions, 41 I. GERONTOLOGY 353, 358
(1986). Braithwaite speculates that when an elderly person does not exhibit the stereotyped
characteristics of decrement, the person "exceeds expectations" and thus is judged more favorably.
See id.
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It is undeniable that aging sometimes undermines aspects of physical and
mental health. However, even apart from mounting evidence that these
effects are reversible far more often than generally recognized,S) the idea of
decrement vastly simplifies the complex processes affecting an
extraordinarily large and diverse group of individuals. S4 In fact, wholesale
mental and physical decrement is not an inevitable part of the aging process.
Instead of progressive decline, the vast majority of "older people functionO
at much the same level over quite a long period of time, suffering the usual
ups and downs of health that are experienced at all ages, but not
deteriorating as is popularly supposed. "55 Put simply, the vast majority of
the aged are sharp as a tack and do not suffer from a progressive decline in
competence. S6
The ultimate point is a simple one: the category "elderly" is a social
construction. 57
The notion that the "elderly" embody an inevitable
decremental process is "inevitable" only insofar as members of societyyoung and old and in-between-take it as the "truth" and define themselves
and their relations with others in terms of it. 58
Needless to say, the idea of decrement affects the attorney/elderly client
relationship.
At the broadest level, the idea of decrement-like all
stereotypes-promotes a homogenized discourse about, with, and by the

53. See infra text accompanying notes 73-77.
54. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to
the Law, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 683, 690 (1991).
55. GIBSON, supra note 45, at 56. This is also true of physical functions even after a
disabling episode like a stroke. See Thomas M. Gill et aI., Predictors of Recovery in Activities of
Daily Living Among Disabled Older Persons Living in the Community, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
757 (1997).
56. A range of statistics support this point. To take just a few: 1) only two to four percent of
the population over sixty-five have Alzheimer's Disease, see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC.,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 137 (4th ed. 1994); 2) severe
psychotic disorders are less prevalent among the elderly than among the non-elderly, see Linda F.
Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J.
CONTEMP. L. 61, 68 (1988); 3) Ninety-five percent of persons over sixty-five and eighty percent of
persons over eighty are not affected by significant cognitive impairment, see Robert P. Roca,
Determining Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1181
(1994).
57. See Estes, supra note 45, at 292; Whitton, supra note 11, at 456 n.4. The influential idea
of "social construction" is usually associated with the intellectual movement called " poststructuralism." For a famous example of post-structuralist analysis, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1990).
58. The idea of decrement reverberates in social policy as well. There is, for example, the
usually implicit notion that the old have lived their lives, and thus their increasing medical and
emotional needs are less legitimate than the needs of other segments of society. See, e.g., GIBSON,
supra note 45, at 60.
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elderly which screens out "dissonant and nonconforming concepts. ,,59 There
is a pervasive social presumption in favor of declining competence among
the elderly and, as a result, attorneys and the population at large-including
the elderly themselves-construct meaning in line with this assumption. 60

IV. THE INTERNALIZATION OF THE IDEA OF DECREMENT

A. Attorneys
Legal scholars have observed how attorney perceptions of clients are
influenced by stereotypes. 61 It should come as no surprise, given the
centrality of the idea of decrement, that attorneys who interact with elderly
clients risk interpreting their clients' behavior as demonstrating cognitive
decline. 62
1.

Interpreting Behavior as Demonstrating Declining Competence

The influence of the idea of decrement highlights mental decline as the
"obvious" explanation for the behavior of an elderly client. 63 Thus, lawyers
59. Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and
'Feminine' Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1643 (1991). For some of the processes identified by
social psychologists that contribute to this process, see supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
60. For a historical overview of this and other assumptions about aging and how they have
changed over time, see W. Andrew Achenbaum, Societal Perceptions of Aging and the Aged, in
HANDBOOK OF AGING & THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 129 (Robert H. Binstock & Ethel Shanas eds., 2d
ed. 1985); Whitton, supra note 11, at 458-63.
61. See, e.g., Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 377~91 (1997) (describing the influence of
race on an attorney's perceptions of African-American clients); Lucie E. White, Subordinotion,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV.
1, 45-48 (1990) (describing the influence of socioeconomic status on attorney's view of client); see
also Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual
Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809-11
(1993) (noting the impact of class, race, ethnicity, age, and other "personal identitication issues" in
attorney lei ient interactions).
62. In this and in succeeding discussions, I focus on "intergroup discourse" between elderly
clients and younger attorneys because such discourse illustrates in an especially stark way the
influence of stereotypes about the elderly. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the elderly do
not or should not practice law.
63. There have been empirical demonstrations of this effect. See, e.g., Rodin & Langer,
supra note 46, at 17-18 (reporting that subjects viewed forgetful behavior by an older person more
negatively than comparable forgetful behavior by a younger person). These effects are a
consequence of the human tendency towards "confirmation bias" and "biased fact assimilation."
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often will assume that elderly clients have experienced declining
competence, and attorneys often will seemingly-but mistakenly-find what
they are looking for. 64
A well-documented example of this phenomenon is the interpretation of
forgetfulness among the elderly. Even though it is hardly unusual for people
of any age to be forgetful about minutiae such as names, places, and
telephone numbers, forgetfulness among the elderly may take on the more
sinister cast of creeping senility. 65 Given the strong link between memory
and prevailing social conceptions of competence, forgetfulnessunremarkable in and of itself-may suddenly be transformed into the
assumption that an elderly person is "losing it.,,66
In addition, when counseling an elderly client, lawyers often assume that
Another
idiosyncratic decisions are the result of incompetence. 67
interpretation might seem less obvious when interacting with the elderly:
idiosyncrasy might be idiosyncrasy. After all, many non-elderly lead lives in
ways that stray from the norm, and these non-elderly might well be seen not
as incompetent, but as original or bold. 68
Moreover, an inevitable byproduct of this phenomenon is that, like
Sherlock Holmes once observed, "we do not consider especially informative
See supra text accompanying notes 38-40; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 338-39 (1987) ("In
ambiguous social situations, it will always be easier to find evidence supporting an individual's
assumed group characteristics than to find contradictory evidence. ").
64. This kind of behavior was found in an experiment in which psychotherapists were
presented with two case studies describing pathological behavior. See Rodin & Langer, supra note
46, at 19. The only significant difference between the two descriptions were the ages of the
subjects: one was described as young, the other in his or her sixties and seventies.
The
psychotherapists "showed a greater propensity to diagnose the same psychotic behavior as
organically based when the individual was old rather than young." Id. A similar study involving
less serious pathology found that psychotherapists far more frequently recommended treatment
involving drugs and institutionalization for older subjects. See id.
65. See PRATT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 87-88.
66. See id. at 87-88. This is not a new observation. Dr. Samuel Johnson noted that "[iJf a
young man or a middle-aged man, when leaving a company, does not recollect where he laid his
hat, it is nothing. But if the same inattention is discovered in an old man, people shrug their
shoulders and say his memory is going." SIEGFRIED KRA, AGING MYTHS: REVERSIBLE CAUSES OF
MIND AND MEMORY Loss 4 (1986).
67. See Rein, supra note 12, at 1126; Rosoff & Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 29-30.
68. A useful thought experiment might be to ask whether an elderly person's action would
appear to be irrational if performed by a non-elderly person. See Whitton, supra note 11, at 455.
This strategy recalls Charles Lawrence's suggestion about how changing "I don't think of you as a
Negro" into "I don't think of you as white" demonstrates the racism of the first statement.
Lawrence, supra note 63, at 341-42; see also Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and
Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civil Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education,
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 727 (1994) (suggesting that a teacher "[a]sk students if they would have a
different view of [a poor client's] decision if she were a network anchorperson or a lawyer").
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the fact that the dog did not bark during the night. ,,69 Thus, elderly clients
might engage in a range of perfectly ordinary behavior. Nevertheless, this
"normal" behavior may remain invisible while the occasional memory lapse
or distracted speech stands out as confirming deciining competence. 70
There is a final manifestation of this phenomenon that deserves mention.
A range of common problems among the elderly might hamper their ability
to communicate.
Decreased tongue maneuverability, dry mouth, and
hearing loss all may impede communication. 71 Given the homogenizing
influence of the idea of decrement, it is likely that such symptoms-entirely
unrelated to mental competence-might lead to an utterly unfounded
conclusion of mental impairment. 72

2. Actualism
An "actualist" stance holds that only the actual is possible. 73 What this
means is that certain admittedly "actual" impairments-such as memory
loss-are viewed as fixed and irreversible, and thus only subject to further
deterioration. The possibility that this "actual" state is temporary or
reversible disappears from consideration. 74
In fact, as documented by an enormous body of medical and social
science literature, there are numerous causes of symptoms like memory loss
For example,
unrelated to irreversible, organic cognitive decline. 7'
malnutrition, depression, high or low blood pressure, slow pulse rate,
chemical and blood deficiencies, and, most importantly, medications all can
cause memory loss.76 Similarly, "social isolation, transportation problems,
[and] financial insecurity . . . all worsen the functional capacity of older

69. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventures of Silver Bloze (1892), cited in Lord, supra note
39, at 1239.
70. See, e.g., Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 178 ("there is considerable likelihood that
competent behaviours of older adults will be under-utilised in forming the first impressions so
critical to initial and subsequent encounters").
71. See Goodenough, supra note 16, at 56. See also Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 26.
These conditions afflicted the ninety-year-old client I described above. See supra text accompanying
notes 6-8.
72. See, e.g., Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 179.
73. I have borrowed this term from Daniel C. Dennett. See DENNETf, supra note 17, at 260.
74. Such a stance reflects the emphasis among gerontologists on accommodative as opposed
to restorative approaches in analyzing the needs of the elderly. See Estes, supra note 45, at 294.
75. See generally KRA, supra note 66; Ellen Bouchard Ryan, Beliefs About Memory Changes
Across the Adult Life Span, 471. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. P41 (1992).
76. See generally KRA, supra note 66.

CLIENT COMPETENCE

31:121]

137

people. ,,77 Obviously, attorneys are not qualified to medically examine
clients to determine possible causes of mental impairment or memory loss,
but the possibility of reversible causes might have an enormous impact on
how attorneys construct their interpretation of the mental states of the
elderly.

3.

The Complexity of Competence

The idea of decrement not only homogenizes a diverse population, but
also an extraordinarily complex idea: cognitive functioning. 78 In addition to
contributing to the continuing misconception that competence is a definable,
either/or proposition,79 the idea of decrement also presumes that cognitive
impairment in one area signifies cognitive impairment in all areas. This is
especially true of memory 10SS,80 which (assuming it is permanent) does not
necessarily mean that the client cannot function in other domains or is
incapable of carrying on meaningful conversation. 81
Moreover, an elderly patient who suffers an organic loss of short-term
memory because of a stroke or other illness may deny that such a loss has
occurred. 82 The client may thus construct a fantasy that fills in blanks left by
an impaired memory. For example, if a client does not recognize or has
forgotten that she is hospitalized, she may say, "this is a jail-I have to break
out. " However, even though she misidentifies her location, her attitude
towards her location-her plainly stated desire to leave it-is unequivocal. 83
In other words, the client does view the hospital as the equivalent of jail, and
her notion that it is a jail literalizes a metaphor that a non-impaired person
might employ. This attitude is real, and, at a minimum, should not be
summarily discounted as the mere product of an impaired mental state.

77. Howard Waitzkin et aI., Narratives of Aging and Social Problems in Medical Encounters
with Older Persons. 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 322, 342 (1994). One researcher concluded
that 75% of the disabilities of the elderly are "sociogenic," that is, the result of social attitudes and
stigmatization. ALEX COMFORT, A GOOD AGE 140 (1976).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
80. As previously noted, conventional wisdom considers memory to be a foundation of
competence. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. See also PRATf & NORRIS, supra note 42,
at 87-88.
81. See WetJe, supra note 16, at 264. For example, even the 2-4% of the population over 65
who suffer from Alzheimer's Disease first experience impairment only of "short-term memory and
concentration, while sparing long-term memory, values, convictions, and personality." Rosoff &
Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 7.
82. See Smith, supra note 56, at 71.
83. See id.
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"I'm Not Impaired, So The Client Must Be"

The idea of decrement implies a gulf between the elderly client and the
younger, presumably more "with it" attorney. This leads to a process best
described by a cartoon in which one figure says to the other: "Senile
dementia? Isn't that when elderly clients disagree with you about what's best
for them?,,84
This cartoon captures a classic error on the part of those who work with
the elderly, including attorneys: any disagreements about what is best for a
client are not "real" disagreements because the client's position must be
distorted by mental impairment. 85 Thus, the idea of decrement furnishes a
particularly "logical" interpretation of client intransigence. 86
This line of reasoning plays out in many contexts. For example, some
elderly clients relish the safety of not making decisions. 87 Such a client
might willingly cede decision-making responsibility to an attorney, family
member, friend, or member of the clergy. 88 This is not to say, of course,
that an attorney should accept such a delegation at face value, particularly
when the possibility of p~ysical, mental or financial abuse exists. However,
84. Reproduced in BERNARD INEICHEN, SENILE DEMENTIA: POLICY AND SERVICES (1989).
85. For a discussion of "paternalism" under such circumstances, see Luban, supra note 26, at
466-82.
86. Anthony Alfieri alludes to a related phenomenon when he describes how "[p]overty
lawyers fail to apprehend the meaning of their clients' struggles, preferring to search client
character for evidence of pathology." Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2134 n.96 (1991).
87. This tendency might be related to the importance that dependency has on the elderly. See
infra text accompanying notes 115-16.
88. William H. Simon describes a case which illustrates this point. See Simon, supra note
27, at 214-16. Simon represented a sixty-tive-year-old woman in a criminal case involving a traffic
accident. Despite Simon's best efforts, the client and her minister insisted that Simon was "the
expert," and thus should tell her what to do. See id. at 215.
One study found that at least in doctor-patient interactions, older people are significantly more
likely to defer to authority than younger people. See Marie Haug, Doctor Patient Relationships and
the Older Patient, 34 J. GERONTOLOGY 852, 854-57 (1979) (elderly found to have "greater
adherence to traditional authority relationships"). One explanation for such deference is that the
elderly are from a "societal milieu" which fostered "an unquestioning belief in physician altruistic
expertise" and "respect for authority."
Marie R. Haug, Elderly Patients, Caregivers, and
Physicians: Theory and Research on Health Care Triads, 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. I, 2-4
(1994). It is thus possible that some clients-especially elderly clients-are particularly comfortable
with the "professional in charge" paradigm that is anathema to the conception of lawyering as
"client-centered." See Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 29-30 (some elderly patients "could
conceivably be more comfortable with the 'old-fashioned' familiar style of 'doctor in charge'").
However, there are obvious dangers in ascribing a unitary "social milieu" to a large of group of
people of strikingly different backgrounds. See Howard Giles et aI., Communication, Health and
the Elderly: Frameworks, Agenda and a Model, in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY
I, 10 (Howard Giles et al. eds., 1990) ("the elderly emanate from different historical periods with
their own cohorts, values and predispositions").
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at the same time, an attorney should not assume that "impairment" is the
only, or even primary, explanation for this behavior.
Along the same lines, it seems inconceivable that a client might wish to
stay in a filthy apartment, cohabitate with an exploitive relative, or otherwise
prefer the status quo when potentially available alternatives seem
economically and qualitatively superior. However, some elderly individuals
are acutely vulnerable to environmental instability. 89 Given the accumulating
losses of income, friends, relatives, and occupation, these clients may relish
stability-however seemingly ill-advised or trivial-wherever and however
they find it. 90 In this light, it is possible that such behavior might be
perfectly "rational" and "competent" under the client's circumstances.

B. The Elderly Client
The elderly are an extraordinarily diverse population. Each elderly
person, like everyone else, has a unique set of life experiences and a unique
personality. This is always critical to keep in mind: when describing groups,
such as the elderly, that are the subject of stereotyping, there is always the
risk of replacing one stereotype-here the idea of decrement-with another
equally misleading and simplified stereotype, such as the idea that all elderly
are fully competent and healthy. 91 This raises the inevitable difficulty of, as
Deborah Rhode has put it, "theorizing from experience without
homogenizing it. ,,92 Even with this caveat, it is nevertheless critical to study
patterns that emerge across categories of individuals, such as the elderly, as
a means to examine social domination and stereotyping. 93
In fact, the idea of decrement influences many elderly clients as well as
attorneys, even to the extent of sometimes creating "real" behavior that, in
the end, generates mental impairment. 94 While not all elderly clients will
uniformly internalize the idea of decrement and some react against "elderly
89. See Howard B. Gelt, Psychological Considerations in Representing the Aged Client, 17
ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 300 (1975). See also Haug & Dry, supra note 45, at 14 (noting "the salience
of person-environmenr tit in the elderly's sense of well-being").
90. See Gelt, supra note 89, at 300-01.
91. See. e.g., Theory and Experience, supra note 31, at 1023 (arguing that the construct
"battered woman" submerges the complex and tluid circumstances of victims of domestic abuse into
"a single, uniform experience"); Altieri, supra note 86, at 2122 (arguing against "an essenrialist
vision of the voices and narratives of impoverished clients" even when inconsistent with prevailing
narratives).
92. Rhode, supra note 33, at 42.
93. See White, supra note 5, at 1504, 1506 (arguing for inquiry into "recurring patterns of
domination" as well as a more Foucauhian focus on the "microdynamics of everyday life").
94. See infra text accompanying notes 98-116.
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identity roles and styles and deny stereotypic attributions in their own and in
others' talk, ,,95 some elderly clients will internalize the idea of decrement and
thus "sound, look, feel, think, and act older. "96 It is these clients who are
especially at risk of appearing incompetent. 97
1.

The Elderly Client's Internalization of the Idea of Decrement

Stereotypes influence the thoughts and self-image of the targets of
stereotypes. Recent studies have detailed how insidious and pervasive these
effects can be. For example, Claude Steele's work on a process he calls
"stereotype vulnerability" demonstrates that victims o( stereotypes have a
tendency to perform in accordance with the expectations generated by the
stereotypes. 98 Legal scholars also have explored similar ideas, especially in
the areas of race and gender. 99
It is extraordinarily difficult for the elderly to avoid internalizing ideas
about cognitive decline. The elderly often navigate through a world
consIstmg of the "aging enterprise" -the "programs, organizations,
bureaucracies, interest groups, trade associations, providers, industries, and
professionals that serve the aged in one capacity or another." 100 This
"enterprise" has a profound impact on how the elderly view themselves and
the world. Although it is unfair to indict the whole enterprise as ageist,
much of this enterprise seeks to accommodate the purported progressive
decline of aging as opposed to restoring the quality of life of the elderly. 101
In this, the "aging enterprise" embodies the idea of decrement.
95. Giles et aI., supra note 88, at 11.
96. Id. at 10. See also Elias S. Cohen, The Elderly Mystique: Constraints on the Autonomy of
the Elderly with Disabilities. GERONTOLOGIST, Supp. June, 1988, at 24 (in some settings, "the
elderly themselves have bought into an elderly mystique which holds that the potentials for growth,
development. and continuing engagement vinually disappear"); Ryan, supra note 75, at P41 (stating
the cognitive function of some elderly diminish because of low social expectations).
97. See supra text accompanying note 52.
98. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual
Test Performance of African Americans, 69 I. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 797, 808 (1995).
99. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 378-79 (describing research exploring how expectations
induce the objects of those expectations to act in accordance with them); Deborah L. Rhode,
Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1189 (1988) (stating "[a]s both
experimental and longitudinal studies have repeatedly demonstrated, low expectations of
achievement frequently become self-fulfilling prophecies."); Theory and Experience, supra note 31,
at 1056 (noting that a victim of domestic violence "herself may be affected by the understandings of
domestic violence that she finds in the legal system and the rest of her world"). For a probing
examination of the internalization of oppression, see Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons
from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699.
100. CARROLL L. ESTES, THE AGING ENTERPRISE 2 (1979).
101. See Estes, supra note 45, at 294.
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Moreover, the home life of some elderly persons fosters a sense of
and helplessness:

~dependency

In some families, all responsibilities and chores are taken away
from the elderly patient. He or she no longer has to make
decisions or be concerned about planning a meal. This can happen
in a home environment and to a greater extent in a nursing home.
When one is shut into a silent world surrounded by people of the
same generation and having no outside stimuli, there is no necessity
to use one's memory or the imaginative or constructive instinct of
earlier years. 102
The elderly may thus view themselves in line with prevailing stereotypes,
especially the idea of decrement. 103 A simple manifestation of this will likely
be familiar: although it is rare for adults to mention their age in ordinary
conversation, the elderly do so regularly. 104 One study found many
examples, such as "well I'm almost eighty and I can't expect much. ,,105 This
recalls the "my grandmother is eighty-six, but she's still sharp as a tack"
example discussed earlier. 106 As with that earlier statement, age disclosure
among the elderly reflects an assumed link between advanced chronological
age and physical and emotional decline.
The prevalent of such age
disclosure demonstrates that many elderly construe their own well-being in
terms of the idea that aging is a decremental process. 107

2.

Consequences

While, at a minimum, the idea of decrement is a significant challenge to
older people's morale and confidence,108 its potential consequences are
pervasive.
Memory Loss-The non-elderly are not alone in interpreting forgetfulness
among the elderly client as manifesting cognitive decline; the elderly may do
the same thing. 109 As one researcher has put it, "[a]ge-based memory beliefs
may sensitize older persons to be more aware of the same everyday memory
failures that they have experienced all their lives. ,,110 Especially when
102. KRA, supra note 66, at 4.
103. See Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 15; Cohen, supra note 96, at 24.
104. See COUPLAND ET AL. supra note 41, at 59.
105. Id. at 138
106. See supra text accompanying note 50.
107. See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 150.
108. See id. at 24; Estes, supra note 45, at 293; Ryan, supra note 75, at P41.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
110. Ryan, supra note 75, at P41.
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coupled with the lack of stimulation that afflicts the day to day lives of some
elderly people, this "reality" becomes reality, and there really can be
memory loss. III Such memory loss, however, is not organic, and may be
remedied by correcting situational factors contributing to these problems. II?
Helplessness-A primary component of the idea of decrement is its
purported inevitability.
In the face of this, some elderly may. "see
themselves as unable to manage their environment" which, in turn, promotes
feelings of helplessness and loss of control. 113 Some elderly people attribute
problems to the irreparable ravages of age, and not to specific situations
which may be. subject to change. 114 Such an attribution has important
consequences for an attorney/client relationship: attorneys are situational
problem-definers and problem-solvers, and elderly clients might thus view
lawyers (and everyone else) as powerless to stem the inevitable emergence of
age-related problems.
Dependency- Related to the notion of helplessness is that some elderly
view themselves as dependent upon others for their financial, physical, and
emotional well-being. As with all aspects of a category as broad as
"elderly," the degree of an individual client's dependency varies
enormously. liS Nevertheless, perceived or actual dependency in certain
realms may render elderly clients reluctant to offer their perspectives or to
participate actively in their own representation. Such dependency is not
necessarily inevitable but, rather, "an as yet undetermined (but significant)
amount of dependency is modifiable, preventable, or reversible. ,,116 Such a
culture of dependency renders some elderly clients reluctant to take the lead
in offering their perspective and in structuring their own legal solutions.

111. See ill. (asserting that "[IJower self-evaluations of memory. based in part on negative
social expectations. can lead 10 poorer memory performance through their indirect impact on
decreased effort. less use of adaptive strategies. avoidance of challenging situations. and failure to
seek medical attention for disease-related symptoms of forgetfulness"); Rodin & Langer, supra note
46, at 24-25.
112. Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 24-26.
113. John M. Wiemann et aI., Communication with the Elderly: Implications for Health Care
and Social Suppon in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY 229 (Howard Giles et al.
eds., 1990); Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 22-26.
114. See, e.g., Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 13 (explaining that as a result of "ageism," the
elderly "may be apt to attribute many of their complaints to the inevitable results of old age");
WetJe, supra note 16, at 260 (describing "learned helplessness" among the elderly).
115. See, e.g., Frolik & Barnes, supra note 54, at 698-703.
116. Estes, supra note 45, at 293 (citations omitted).

31:121]

CLIENT COMPETENCE

143

V. THE DISCOURSE OF DECREMENT

Any conversation between the elderly and younger interlocutors-like any
conversation between two human beings-is an extraordinarily complex and
dynamic process. It inevitably involves numerous strategies with varied and
sometimes contradictory motivations which are, in turn, subject to diverse
interpretations depending on the strategies and motivations of the person
doing the listening.
While "discourse analysis" focusing on the
microdynamics of conversation recently has become the subject of serious
inquiry in legal scholarship, 117 other scholars within the last decade also have
engaged in groundbreaking explorations of "intergroup discourse" between
the young and the 01d. 118 These analyses yield further insights into how the
idea of decrement influences attorney/client interactions.

A. "Overaccommodation" by Younger Interlocutors
Given the assumption that the elderly are "relatively incompetent, slow,
old-fashioned and inflexible,''' 19 younger interlocutors "frequently
overaccommodate their speech to stereotyped expectations of an elder's
communication needs, as opposed to actual needs. ,,120 The result is likely to
be patronizing. The classic example is the use of "babytalk" when speaking
to an elderly person l21 -an explicit reinforcement of the assumption that old
age is a "second childhood." However, even if not full-fledged babytalk,
overaccommodation typically employs one or more modifications of
"ordinary" discourse, such as "slower speech rate, exaggerated intonation,

117. For application of "discourse analysis" to interactions between lawyers, clients, and (in
some cases) judges, see JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. Q'BARR, RULES VERSUS
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Davis, supra note 59, at 1635;
Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3; Gay Gellhorn et aI., Law and Language: An Interdisciplinary Study
of Client Interviews, 1 CLINICAL L. REY. 245 (1994). Although the amount of such research is
increasing, there is relatively little exploring attorney/client discourse in contrast to, for example,
physician-patient interactions. See Gellhorn et aI., supra, at 247-48. For a review of discourse
analysis and the related tields of inquiry that use it, see id. at 251-55.
118. See, e.g., COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, 152-71; Justine Coupland & Nikolas
Coupland, 'Old Age Doesn't Come Alone': Discursive Representations of Health-in-Aging In
Geriatric Medicine, 39 INT'L J. AGING & HUMAN DEY. 81 (1994); Howard Waitzkin et aI., supra
note 77, at 322.
119. COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 31.
120. Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 173; see also COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 31.
121. Id. This conversational strategy retlects the "inverted U" model of mental competence
over the lifespan. See supra text accompanying note 44. I employed this strategy when speaking to
one of the elderly clients I described in Part I. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
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use of high pitch, increased loudness, more repetitions, tag questions, altered
pronoun use, and simplification of vocabulary and grammar. ,,122
The impact of overaccommodation on an elderly interlocutor is often
equivocal. Such "nurturing" talk might "convey warmth and caring"
attributes which are usually valued by an elderly person. 123 At the same
time, the same Client might view such talk as demeaning,, 24 Moreover, the
intent of such strategies is to foster communication, such overaccomodation
might foster "a sense of helpless dependence" on the part of the elderly
client,125 and thus promote dependence and feelings of incompetence. 126
Indeed, one study showed that elders preferred speech to be "simple," but
that simplification might, at the same time, be viewed as disrespectful or
patronizing. 127

B. Discursive Strategies by the Elderly
Interactions are necessarily joint affairs, and focusing on the stereotypical
assumptions of younger interlocutors overlooks how discourse is inevitably a
negotiation of reality on the parts of all interlocutors. 128 In fact, elderly
speakers employ strategies in conversation for a variety of reasons, and these
strategies, in turn, often reinforce stereotypes about the decremental process
of aging.

1.

Age-Marking and Self-Handicapping

The elderly often "mark" themselves in conversation as members of a
social category called "elderly." These conversational strategies will likely
122. Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 173; see also COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 36.
123. PRATT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 176; Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 174, 184-85.
124. See PRATT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 176; Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 174, 18485.
125. Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 187-188; see also Theory and Experience, supra note 31,
at 1056-57 (describing how attorney/client interactions risk imposing on a victim of domestic
violence "the understandings of domestic violence that she finds in the legal system and in the rest
of her world").
126. See PRATT & NORRIS. supra note 42, at 176; Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 174. As
one nursing home resident observed: "Why do you think the staff insists on talking baby talk when
speaking to me? I understand English. I have a degree in music and am a cenitied teacher. Now I
hear a lot of words that end in 'y.' Is this how my kids felt? My hearing aid works tine. There is
little need for anyone to position their face directly in front of mine and raise their voice with those
'y' words." Whitton, supra note 11, at 473.
127. See Ryan & Cole, supra note 52, at 184-85.
128. See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 37; see also Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3, at
1449-50.
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be familiar. As noted above,129 many elderly freely disclose their age, even
though such disclosures at initial meetings are viewed as socially taboo
among the non-elderly. 130
The elderly may also explicitly refer to
themselves as "old" or "elderly," or appear to be self-obsessed. 131 While
such "self-handicapping" strategies appear to be classic signs of feeblemindedness, they may be motivated by needs that are common to all ages
and that have nothing to do with cognitive decline. These strategies might,
for example, be designed to: 1) elicit patience or sympathy; 2) elicit
compliments or praise by the younger speaker that the older person is, for
example, "remarkable for her age," thereby bolstering an older person's
self-esteem; or 3) act as "a means for gaining compliance or services. ,,132
However, the impact on the younger interlocutor might be that the elderly
person is seen as self-centered, selfish, or "not all there."

2.

Off-Topic Verbosity

From the perspective of the non-elderly, it is common for the elderly to
become obsessed with seeming trivialities.
For example, researchers
transcribed the following conversation between an eighty-five year old
Although suffering no
woman ("D") and a younger woman ("Je").
cognitive impairment, D was effectively homebound after an operation and
partially blind. 133
D: but in all ways prices are crazy(.) now(.) er for example at
breakfast{.) I never could eat breakfast{.) a couple of biscuits are
all I like for my breakfast
JC: mm
D: I like a plain biscuit I like an Osbourne biscuit{.) well, Edna
got them for me{.) um{.) oh until about oh about two or three
months ago(.) she said to me well she said{.) I had a real shock
today{.) she said she had always got the biscuits at such and such a
place but she went into another supermarket that she doesn't often
go into{.) and the same packet of biscuits(.) Osbourne biscuits
which she had been paying twenty-five pence for(.) in this shop

See supra text accompanying notes 104-107.
See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 56.
131. See id. at 60.

129.
130.

132. [d. at 49.
133. See id. at 39.
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were fifteen (1.0) now(.) a packet of biscuits(.) and ten pence
variation on them

JC: gosh (.) that's a lot isn't it?
0: I think there should be some price control

JC: mm(.) mm(.) there isn't though(.) is there?134

Interestingly, JC-a researcher
conversation to be "mundane" and
unusual for 0 to launch into another
all too easy to ascribe vaguely to
alternative explanations exist:

in
elderly discourse-found D's
"overassertive. ,,135 It might not be
discussion of biscuits, a trend "that is
cognitive decrement. ,,136 However,

It is entirely understandable that [0] should take whatever limited
opportunities she has to be conversationally assertive and that,
through a combination of limited topic repertoire, infrequent social
contacts, and a largely non-changing milieu, she should misjudge
the newsworthiness of the issue to her interlocutors. 137

Thus, under this interpretation, ostensibly decremental behavior might
actually be one of the few modes of assertiveness left to 0.138 JC's vague
responses betray a sense of not knowing how to interpret all of this.
A related strategy sometimes employed by the elderly is "time-shiftinginto the past, from focus on the present or recent past. ,,139 The past is a time
necessarily unknown to a younger interlocutor, and, as a result, furnishes a
means to assert control in conversation. Once again, this is hardly the stuff
of mental impairment.

134. Id. at 42-43. The punctuation of this passage follows the conventions of discourse
analysis: the parentheses with a period signify a brief pause; a number in parenthesis describes the
length of a pause in seconds; and italicized syllables were heavily stressed by the speaker. See id. at
200.
135. Id. at 42.
136. /d.
137. Id. at 43. The negotiation of conversational asseniveness or, put another way, "topic and

tloor control," is a critical element in discourse generally and has been studied in the context of
attorney/client interactions. See, e.g., Gellhorn et a!., supra note 117, at 283-88; Linda F. Smith,
Interviewing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of the "Traditional" Interview and the "ClientCentered" Interview, 1 CUNICALL. REV. 541, 561-64 (1995).
138. Other interpretations are equally plausible. Perhaps most obviously, D might simply have
always been conversationally assertive-hardly an unknown trait among the non-elderly-and has
remained so as she has grown older.
139. See COUPLAND ET AL., supra note 41, at 63.
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This analysis merely hints at the complexity of elderly discourse.
Although conversational strategies employed by the elderly might well have
nothing at all to do with the supposed decremental process of aging, they
may resonate with this idea and thus lead to an assumption that the person
actually suffers from cognitive decline.

C. Warning Signs

Given that intergroup discourse is rife with complexities and potential
misunderstandings, an elderly client might be dissatisfied or seemingly never
satisfied with legal representation. As a result, a client may act in ways that
are disquieting to the attorney. The idea of decrement might once again lead
an attorney to conclude that the client is impaired-an interpretation that
conveniently absolves the attorney of responsibility for working to better
meet the needs of the client. l40
In fact, such disquieting behavior by clients should act-at least in the
first instance-as a warning sign that the attorney needs to further explore
what might be motivating or concerning a client. Two circumstances in
which this frequently arises are with clients who repeatedly contact the
attorney, and with clients who do not comply with ostensibly agreed-upon
activities to further the goals of the representation.

1.

"Keeping Contact"

Sometimes the failure to address underlying issues facing an elderly client
or a concern about abandonment might lead such clients to "fear interruption
of contact and bring up new concerns ... in order to continue as clients. ,,141
This phenomenon has been called "keeping contact. ,,142 From the attorneys'
perspective, these clients are nuisances. They call repeatedly, seemingly
viewing the attorneys' time as limitless. While non-elderly clients may
exhibit such behavior, attorneys are especially likely to view it as
demonstrating a mental impairment when the clients are elderly.
Attorneys may transform examples of "keeping contact" into indictments
of the client's mental state. 143 However, such behavior should spur attorneys
140. Racial stereotyping might also lead attorneys to characterize clients as "difficult.» See
Jacobs, supra note 61, at 355.
141. Haug & Dry, supra note 45, at 19.
142. ld.
143. This recalls the problem of "I'm not impaired, so you must be," noted at supra text
accompanying notes 84-90. In Ihat earlier instance, a client's seemingly incomprehensible goals are
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to revisit their working conception of their client's needs. Such an enterprise
might generate a richer understanding of what is "really" concerning the
client. 144

2.

Noncompliance

Clients sometimes agree to perform certain activities designed to promote
the clients' goals, such as conduct factual research, drop off relevant papers,
or provide information over the telephone. Often to the attorney's surprise,
clients fail to complete what they have agreed to do. Again, while such a
"tactic of resistance" has been observed among clients generally,145 when the
client is elderly, attorneys might presume mental impairment, and suspect
that the client is somehow sabotaging the success of the representation
because of an inability to follow directions or understand consequences.
Instead of the convenient interpretation of mental impairment, such behavior
might-like "keeping contact"-mean that the attorney may have seriously
misconstrued-or at least could understand more about-issues facing the
client. 146

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE THEORY

The preceding discussion has explored how a single social assumptionthe idea of decrement-influences the ways attorneys and elderly clients
think and act. This discussion, of course, has vastly simplified the many
circumstances that may influence such interactions. However, even this
simplified discussion raises important questions about how best to
conceptualize what attorneys can and should do when they represent elderly
clients.
This section will first consider these questions by discussing a cornerstone
of client-centered lawyering-the process of "empathic understanding" -and
the impact of this technique on elderly clients in light of the preceding
dismissed as a product of mental incompetence-a far easier conclusion to reach than to consider
alternative, "rational" explanations for the client's behavior.
144. It is also possible that "keeping contact" is motivated by what would appear to an outsider
to be a disproportionate anxiety about some "small" matter. Again, while this may appear to
manifest cognitive decline, a more likely explanation is simply that isolation has diminished the
scope of the "world" of the client, and thus what occurs within that world is especially significant to
the client. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39.
145. See, e.g., Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3, at 1467-70; White, supra note 61, at 44-52.
146. See Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 27-28 (noting that failure to take medication among
the elderly might be an assertion of independence).
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discussion. Next, this section will draw upon this analysis in order to
explore more generally assumptions underlying client-centered lawyering.
A. The Virtues and Pitfalls of Empathic Understanding

"Empathic understanding" is fundamental to client-centered lawyering.147
Binder, Bergman and Price firmly believe in the power of this technique;
they quote Carl Rogers who wrote that empathic understanding is a means to
"enterD into the experience of clients in order to develop a feeling for their
inner world and how they view both this inner world and the world of people
and [events] around them. ,,148 In the context of representing elderly
clients,149 empathic understanding may be especially useful. Given social
isolation and devaluation, some elderly clients exhibit presumed mental
impairments because of a fear of loneliness. Indeed, such clients may crave
"empathic understanding" to such an extent that the technique may reveal
complexities and ambivalences in a client's perspective that would otherwise
remain concealed. ISO
147. BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 40-42. Binder, Bergman and Price suggest the technique
of "active Iistening"-a "process of picking up a client's message and sending it back in a reflective
statement which mirrors what you have heard" -as the best way to promote empathic
understanding. [d. at 41, 52. The centrality that Binder, Bergman and Price ascribe to this
technique has not been without its critics. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43
HASTINGS LJ. 991, 1005-1010 (1992). In a related vein, some commentators have argued that
client-centered lawyering is not the apolitical set of neutral techniques that it purports to be. See,
e.g., William H. Simon, Homo Psycho/ogicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 487, 548-50 (1980). See generally Jacobs, supra note 61 (arguing that client-centered
lawyering may reproduce racial prejudice).
148. BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 40.
149. Binder, Bergman and Price suggest that the client-centered approach cannot be used "in
instances where a client ... suffers from mental incapacity." [d. at 20 n.17, 285 n.63. This is, of
course, true in instances of patently severe mental impairment (although, as noted supra, text
accompanying notes 73-77, even such "severe" cases may result from reversible causes). However,
jettisoning the whole approach when clients are questionably incompetent necessarily begs the
question of how best to explore issues of competency within a client-centered framework.
150. This idea received particular attention in the literature addressing doctor/elderly patient
interactions. See Waitzkin et aI., supra note 77, at 342 (in a medical context, arguing for
"supportive listening" during which "doctors should let patients tell their stories . . . in an openended way"); Haug & Ory, supra note 45, at 29 ("an empathetic manner signals respect for the
concerns of the patient" and is "an essential element in satisfactory doctor-elderly patient
relationships. "). Empathic understanding can sometimes yield important insights. For example, the
psychiatric literature describes one elderly patient who claimed that she had received a call from her
doctor claiming that she did not need surgery-a call which, in fact, had never taken place. See
Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 15, at 1463-64. However, during a second interview, while
maintaining that the telephone call took place, the patient also described a profound fear of
abandonment as a result of the surgery. This led her consulting psychiatrist to conclude that the
patient's "psychotic response to the recommendation for surgery was an attempt to draw those
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However, "empathic understanding" also entails significant risks. This
sort of response-an "accommodating" or "high attuning" behavior-may
reinforce social norms about aging lSI and may promote dependency.ls2 As
three leading researchers on the discourse of the elderly have put it:
[T]hose elderly who see themselves as 'old and of declining
health'-and from our own data this is not at all uncommon-may
seek out and cue sympathetic and attuned responses from their
interactants. This can be non-supportive in the longer term to the
extent that they may reinforce ill and aging identities .... IS3

The consequences of such a scenario for attorney/client relationships are
troubling.
Some elderly clients may attribute difficulties-a negligent
landlord, an abusive relative-to their advanced age, not to the actions of
individuals who can legally be forced to modify their behavior. ls4 Under this
circumstance, "empathic understanding" might reinforce damaging
stereotypes about aging on the part of both the attorney and client.
Alternatives to "empathic understanding" carry their own advantages and
disadvantages. 155 For example, a more active, "critical lawyering" approach
might challenge client assumptions and affirmatively convince the client that
situational factors-not the progressive decline of old age-lie at the root of a
problem.
Such a strategy might combat dependency and foster
independence. Indeed, one study has shown that such a strategy tends to
motivate formerly disengaged individuals to be more active and social at
least in a non-legal context. 156 These effects obviously could be significant
when negotiating an attorney/client relationship and promote a more active
stance on the part of the client. 157

around her into deeper involvement." Id. In the end, "{w]hen these concerns were pointed out to
her and empathized with, she indicated that although she still feared the surgery, she would accept
it." Id ..
151. See Giles et ai., supra note 88, at 13-17.
152. See id. at 13-14.
153. [d. at 17 (citation omitted).
154. See Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 23; see also Banziger & Drevenstedt, supra note
45, at 472.
155. These questions are also analyzed in psychological literature more generally. Much of the
client-centered lawyering literature draws upon the work of Carl Rogers, who emphasized empathy
and "unconditional positive regard" in psychotherapy. See Simon, supra note 147, at 511-16.
However, other approaches to psychotherapy adopt a far more active-even challenging-role for
the therapist. See Ellmann, supra note 147, at 1011.
156. See Rodin & Langer, supra note 46, at 24.
157. See id. at 25 ("restructuring the environment to make it more demanding, and then
motivating elderly people to increase their cognitive ability, leads to improvements in memory that
are generalizable").
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Of course, such a stance potentially creates problems. If, as noted above,
some conversational strategies by the elderly are designed to elicit
sympathy,IS8 clients might grow to dislike such a "low-attuning" stance and
the attorney who employs it. Given the internalization of the idea of
decrement, the elderly client might be offended by the attorney's socially
inappropriate lack of sympathy for the conventional effects of aging.
Moreover, the great risks of the "traditional" non-client-centered approaches
to lawyering might emerge: the imposition of an attorney's value system,
further disempowering already disempowered groups, and shutting down
dialogue. 159

B. Consequences for Theory
The two-edged nature of empathic understanding when representing
elderly clients furnishes a point of entry for considering some of the
premises underlying client-centered lawyering. This exploration must be
undertaken with care; an important qualification in the literature on clientcentered lawyering is that its principles might require modification or might
not apply with respect to certain clients or certain cases. l60 That said,
however, the influence of the idea of decrement raises questions about some
settled ways of talking about client-centered lawyering.
Client-centered lawyering holds that the client's perspective is the
touchstone of enlightened advocacy. 161 This approach embodies a set of
158. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
159. See Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 720; BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 16-24.
160. For example, a commonly accepted observation is that unlike poor or "outsider" clients,
corporate or wealthy clients are not likely to be subject to attorney domination. See, e.g.,
Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 720. Binder, Bergman and Price also recognize that a client-centered
lawyer need not be a "blind instrumentalist" when "a client's values conflict with fundamental
moral precepts or positive legal rules." BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 18-19.
161. See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 17; Smith, supra note 137, at 543. This approach
has amacted criticism. Some critiques hold that the standard version of client-centered lawyering
does not go far enough in promoting the autonomy of the client. See, e.g., Alex 1. Hurder,
Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 71 (1996) (advocating that allorney and client explicitly "negotiate" the terms of the
allorney/client relationship). Conversely, some of the criticism is directed at how theories of c1ientcentered lawyering go 100 far in valorizing the client's goals to the exclusion of broader social and
moral principles that might be at stake in the representation. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress, Client
Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97 (1985); Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 748-49 (1987). There also have been recent
stirrings that client-centered lawyering and the standard critiques of it do not capture the
complexities of how the mind works as explored by cognitive science. See Gary L. Blasi, What
Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 1. LEGAL
EDUC. 313, 317 (1995); Steven L. Winter, Cursing the Darkness, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115,
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strategies that rests upon certain assumptions. "A client-centered conception
assumes that most clients are capable of thinking through the complexities of
their problems. In particular, it posits that clients are usually more expert
than lawyers when it comes to the economic, social and psychological
dimensions of problems. ,,162 Client-centered lawyering thus recognizes "the
importance of clients' expertise, thoughts and feelings in resolving
problems. ,,163 In elaborating this notion, some commentators have adopted
the metaphor of "lawyer as translator" through which attorneys should seek
to translate client stories in order to educate and persuade legal decision";
makers. 1M
The client-centered lawyering model and its elaborations have been and
continue to be critical in seeking to supplant the hidden (or sometimes not so
hidden) premise that _lawyers know what is best for clients. 165 This
perspective also has produced fascinating scholarly narratives about lawyers
directing a course of litigation in accordance with conventional legal
categories-and doing a good job of it under those terms-yet fundamentally
misapprehending what clientS want and how clients want to get what they
want. 166
The insidious influence of the idea of decrement demonstrates how useful
a client-centered lawyering model can be. Operating under the sway of the
idea of decrement, attorneys may systematically misapprehend the needs of
elderly clients. Such situations are classic examples of lawyers unthinkingly
applying their own norms while another set of equally valid norms-the
client's-are silenced.
This highlights the difference and "otherness"
between attorney and client, and how attorneys need to guard against what
seems to be "natural" and "obvious" when defining the means and ends of
representation. 167
However, the influence of the idea of decrement also points to how
prevailing conceptions of attorney/client interactions simplify aspects of
interviewing and counseling, thus impoverishing a lawyer's sense of
complexity and possibility when representing clients. These simplifications
include the notion that there is a single client "story" or "voice," that there
1129-32 (1994). For an overview of some of these critiques and others, see generally Robert D.
Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501
(1990).
162. BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 17.
163. [d. at 18.
164. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1331-39; Gilkerson, supra note 2, at 914-18.
165. See Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 700; Smith, supra note 137, at 542-43.
166. See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Cunningham, supra note 2; White, supra note 61.
167. See Davis, supra note 59, at 1643.
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is such a thing as an "autonomous" client, and that there is such a thing as a
~'neutral" attorney. I will address each of these simplifications in turn.
l.

The Unitary Client "Story" or "Voice"

Given that client-centered lawyering hopes to control attorneys'
inclinations to dominate discourse and misapprehend or ignore client
perspectives, discussions of client-centered lawyering sometimes presuppose
a single and authentic "story" or "voice. "168 However, as every practitioner
knows, problems faced by clients rarely come in neat packages; at any point
in time, client perspectives-like the perspectives of everyone else-are rife
with competing concerns, ambiguities, and ambivalences, and thus are not
unitary. 169 These dissonances and instabilities are not merely risks of
interviewing and counseling, but in many ways define these very
processes. 170
In addition, perspectives of both lawyers and clients are shot through with
assumptions like the idea of decrement. These assumptions play out in a
multitude of ways. Sometimes meanings cohere, sometimes not, but any
client "story" is inevitably the product of a complex set of shifting meanings
negotiated through dialogue. 171

2.

The Autonomous Client

Client-centered lawyering values client "autonomy" in order to preserve
the integrity of client perspectives.172 By reaching out to clients through
168. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1335-38; Gilkerson, supra note 2, at 897;
Margulies, supra note 18, at 1079-80.
169. See Altieri, supra note 86, at 2119; Naomi Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J.
2475, 2485-93 (1993); Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 715-16; Theory and Experience, supra note 31,
at 1032-33.
170. See Dinerstein, supra note 2, at 716 (criticizing "the unfortunate message that the
counselor's role is the technical one of laying out options and alternatives rather than participating
fully in the often messy process of making real world decisions"); Gellhom et aI., supra note 117,
at 248 (criticizing the conception of client interviews as "dominated by administrative tasks, and by
fact gathering"). For an insightful treatment of the complexities of attorney/client interactions in
the context of divorce cases, see generally Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 117-46.
172. See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 261; Beverly Balos, The Bounds of Professionalism:
Challenging Our Students, Challenging Ourselves, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 129, 131 (1997).
"Autonomy derives from the Greek roots 'auto' for self and 'nomos' for law, literally self-ruling."
Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 33, 73 n.128 (1996) (citing
Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 27, 32
(John Christman ed., 1989».

154

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

techniques such as empathic understanding, the idea of client autonomy
minimizes attorneys' tendencies to overwhelm clients' values and
perspectives. This, in turn, frees clients to explore their own values and
circumstances.
Autonomy, however, also entails troubling simplifications and
inconsistencies that render its descriptions of attorney/client interactions
problematic. In the context of practice theory, the idea of autonomy
presupposes that clients have some authentic core that is distinct from
external influences. 173 This in turn, presupposes first, that this core can and
should remain stable as clients talk to attorneys, and second, that such a core
is independent of the social world inhabited by attorneys and clients. Such a
view fails to take into account that both attorneys and clients are constrained
and influenced by assumptions about each other, and that these assumptions
play out as attorneys and clients interact. It is uncertain what constitutes a
client's authentic core, given that the core itself is made up of social
assumptions and interactions, including interactions with attorneys. 174
Even setting aside this conceptual difficulty, a narrow focus on
"autonomy" raises troubling questions. If an attorney's role is to preserve
client autonomy by elaborating and translating the client's perspective
without changing it,175 an attorney may choose to empathize with and thereby
affirm, for example, an elderly client's feeling of helplessness in the face of
feared cognitive decline. 176 While fearing to taint the client's perspective,
this attorney risks reaffirming the disempowering force of stereotypes
applied to the elderly and others-a result that is not only disturbing, but that
turns the values of empathic understanding and client-centered lawyering on
their heads. 177
173. See, e.g., Gilkerson, supra note 2, at 918 (stressing the importance of "[p]reserving and
advancing the integrity of the client's story"); Alfieri, supra note 86, at 2146 (the primary task of
poverty lawyers "is to restore integrity to the voices and stories" of clients); Marcy Strauss, Toward
a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV.
315, 336-345 (1987). The notion of autonomy and authenticity appears in other contexts as well.
See, e.g., Kupfer, supra note 172, at 71 (applying notion "of a true identity, of an inner voice" to
ethical decision-making).
174. See Winter, supra note 161, at 1129.
175. Clark Cunningham captures this idea of autonomy when he notes that "[t]he good
translator does not alter the speaker's meaning without the speaker's consent." Cunningham. supra
note 2, at 1300.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 147-59.
177. In a related vein, some commentators have argued that client-centered lawyering is not as
neutral as it purports to be. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 147, at 548-50; see generally Jacobs,
supra note 61, at 345 (arguing that client-centered lawyering may reproduce racial prejudice). Ann
Shalleck recently advocated an active role for attorneys in counteracting pervasive stereotypingalbeit well-meant stereotyping-of battered women. See Theory and Experience, supra note 31, at
1033-36.
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The Neutral Attorney

The same virtues and shortcomings of the idea of autonomy apply to the
idea that attorneys should remain "neutral" when interacting with clients. 178
Binder, Bergman and Price cite "the importance of neutrality" by again
quoting Carl Rogers: "[lawyers] must, to the best of their abilities, put aside
their own biases, prejudices, and points of view in order to understand as
clearly as possible the points of view of their clients." 179 The term
"neutrality" captures how critical it is for lawyers to recognize the power of
their influence, and to counteract this influence by empathizing with clients.
"Neutrality, " however, simplifies the meaning-making process of
attorneys just like "autonomy" simplifies the meaning-making process of
clients. The purportedly "neutral" attorney makes sense of the world
through cultural assumptions and hidden premises like the idea of decrement.
After all, attorneys who hear clients' stories-just like clients who hear
attorneys' stories-cannot help but situate stories within the attorney's own
experience. 180 It is thus uncertain what, if anything, would be left of
meaning, even assuming attorneys could "put aside their own ... points of

Ironically, the choice of whether or not to challenge stereotypes might be illusory given that the
most rigid client-centered lawyer who understands the internalization of oppressive social
stereotypes like the idea of decrement would almost certainly seek to disabuse clients of the
destructive force of such stereotypes, even if only through subtle cues in conversation. William
Simon has written extensively about how attorney perspectives on what is "right" for the client
inevitably, if subtly, color how attorneys counsel clients. See Simon, supra note 3, at 1102-04;
Simon, supra note 27, at 213; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH.
u. L.Q. 691, 700 (1992) ("the notion that advice can be given unshaped by the adviser's own
ethical values is absurd in fact"); Theory and Experience, supra note 31, at 1056 (describing how
"words, actions and a!!itudes [of a!!orneysj affect the client's understanding of herself, her ability to
take action, and her choice of what to do and how to present herself in the world"). A related and
burgeoning area of inquiry addresses "therapeutic jurisprudence," which, among other things,
examines how legal practices inevitably promote or inhibit the psychological well-being of actors in
the legal process. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law
Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775, 798-99
(1997).
178. See BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 288.
179. Id. at 40; see also Dinerstein, supra note 161, at 580-81 (recognizing that "such neutrality
is inevitably false," but noting that the idea of "neutrality" still has value as long as attorneys
recognize that it "is a goal they will never quite achieve").
180. For commentators who have noted how attorneys' expectations influence the
interpretation of a client's situation, see BAKHTIN, supra note 39, at 291; Cahn, supra note 169, at
2490 (describing how the author's "story of what happened to my client is informed by my own
expectations"); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1336-38; Lopez, supra note 3, at 1613-14; Margulies,
supra note 68, at 709-11 (discussing the operation of stock stories and stereotypes in assessing
clients in a law school clinic); White, supra note 61, at 45-48.
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view," given that all meaning has a "point of view. "lSI This is true :even
with the usual caveat that attorneys should be neutral "to the best of their
abilities" or "as much as possible" because even these qualifiers assert that
there is a way to approach meaning apart from our own assumptions and
"points of view." IS2 In this frame, attorney "neutrality" -conceptualized as
a goal that can be approached but never attained-may cause more harm than
good by setting forth a goal that has no meaningful content. 183

4.

Complexities

The influence of the idea of decrement demonstrates the importance of
learning how stereotypes influence how attorneys think about clients. By
understanding the operation of such assumptions, attorneys might take a
more nuanced, complex view of clients and their situations.
However, this seemingly incontrovertible point carries the risk that now
that the scales have fallen from our eyes about the idea of decrement, we are
finally in a position to truly understand elderly clients. This type of trap
assumes, first, that the stereotype operates equally among all members of the
group, and, second, that the identification of one stereotype unmasks the
"real" client.
In fact, not all elderly people internalize the idea of decrement, and not
all do so in the same way. 184 The idea of decrement is merely one idea
among the multitudes that define how we think about and act in the world.
Consider what this article has not addressed. It has not addressed the impact
of gender lS5 or race,186 the impact that divergent or similar personalities
181. Alfieri, supra note 86, at 2121 (criticizing a "perspectiveless" theory of practice); see
also supra text accompanying notes 36-40. Analogous conceptions of "neutrality" in the realm of
judicial decision-making have long been under attack. See Rubinson, supra note 39, at 14.
182. Stanley Fish placed the issue of "neutrality" into a larger frame. Fish argued against
what he calls the possibility of "critical self-consciousness." FISH, supra note 37, at 436-67.
"Critical self-consciousness" holds that we can rise above "interests, preferences and biases" and
avoid "prejudgments" through some combination of self-awareness and tentativeness about our own
beliefs. According to Fish, this process "is itself an 'interested' act, that is, an act performed within
a set of assumptions-concerning what is and is not evidence and what are and are not criteria for
judgment-that is, constitutive of and inseparable from some partial view of the world." Jd. at 439.
Skepticism is not the answer because skepticism itself operates "within-and not outside of-the
already structured field that is consciousness." Jd. at 440.
183. It is worth noting as well that social scientists have found that exhortations to be
"unbiased" and "impartial" have no impact on the human tendency to view facts as confirming what
is already believed. See, e.g., Lord et aI., supra note 39, at 1239.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
185. It has been noted how social attitudes toward elderly women differ from social attitudes
toward elderly men, and that elderly men might negotiate the process of aging differently than
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might have on attorney/client discourse,l87 the significance of the socioeconomic status of the client or of the attorney, 188 the impact of an elderly
client's surroundings (such as a nursing home),189 the impact of an attorney's
or client's appearance,l90 the implications of how attorneys might assume that
their individual experiences with the elderly are generalizable to the elderly
population at large,191 and how other assumptions might be related to the idea
of decrement, such as the idea that the elderly are less deserving of attention
because they have already lived the bulk of their lives or because they
receive a disproportionate share of societal resources. l92
Of course, this list could continue indefinitely. As the philosopher Daniel
Dennett has noted, "[i]ndividual styles are truly unique, the product. of
untold billions of serendipitous encounters over the ages, encounters that
produced first a unique genome, and then a unique upbringing, and finally a
unique set of life experiences." 193 This bewildering complexity insures that
there is never a point in time when two socially situated actors-each with
unique "individual styles" described by Dennett-truly "understand" each
other, especially in a task as involved and ill-defined as legal

elderly women. For a sampling of some lines of inquiry on this important distinction, see GIBSON,
supra note 45, at 75-77; PRAlT & NORRIS, supra note 42, at 88-89; Marilyn Helterline & Marilyn
Nouri, Aging and Gender: Values and Continuity, 6 J. WOMEN & AGING 19, 19-23 (1994).
186. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 15, at 1466; Giles et aI., supra note 88, at 15-17; see
also Jacobs, supra note 61 (addressing the impact of race in counseling).
187. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 15, at 1466.
188. See White, supra note 61, at 45-48.
189. See John F. Nussbaum, Communication and the Nursing Home Environment:
Survivability as a Function of Resident-Nursing Staff Affinity, in COMMUNICATION, HEALTH AND
THE ELDERLY 155 (Howard Giles et al. eds., 1990). For example, ugiven the fact that many
nursing home residents are impaired in cognitive function, all residents are thus assumed to be
similarly impaired." Wetle, supra note 16, at 264.
190. See Charles Stangor & James E. Lange, Mental Representations of Social Groups:
Advances in Understanding Stereotypes and Stereotyping, in 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Mark P. Zann ed., 1994).
191. Social psychologists have explored the human tendency to overestimate the "normativity"
of individual experience. See, e.g., Dale W. Grimn & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social
Inference, and Human Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 319,337-38 (Mark P. Zann ed., 1991).
192. See Wetle, supra note 16, at 260-63; Whitton, supra note 11, at 469-74.
193. DENNElT, supra note 17, at 450. This basic idea has been expressed in many ways in
many different disciplines. See, e.g., BAKHTlN, supra note 39, at 290 ("In any given historical
moment of verbal-ideological life, each generation at each social level has its own language;
moreover, every age group has as a matter of fact its own language, its own vocabulary, its own
particular accentual system that, in their turn, vary depending on social level, academic institution .
. . and other stratifying factors. H); FISH, supra note 37, at 30 (Ueach of us is a member of not one
but innumerable interpretive communities in relation to which different kinds of belief are operating
with different weight and force");.
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representation. 194
While this view raises questions about ideas· like
"neutrality" and "autonomy," it also highlights the importance of greater
understanding and recognition of the complexity of attorney/client
interactions.
C. Consequences for Practitioners and Teachers of Practice

Client-centered lawyering remains a vital way of conceptualizing
attorney/client interactions, but one that simplifies important dimensions of
the lawyering .enterprise. A greater recognition of these complexities,
however, does not mean that practitioners can or should spend endless hours
"exploring meaning" with their clients. The pressures of practice render this
goal impractical.
Nevertheless, a greater emphasis on these additional dimensions of
experience will have several benefits. First, client-centered lawyering, by
invoking the power of certain techniques and the goal of "attorney
neutrality, " tends to send the message that an attorney can reach a
reasonably full understanding of client perspectives. This fosters the illusion
that there comes a point in time when an attorney has "got it," thus
deadening an attorney's ability to be alive to possibilities of meaning at all
points during the representation. Ironically, by recognizing that such a point
of understanding is never possible or even conceivable, attorneys might gain
a greater, more nuanced understanding of client perspectives, the central
goal of client-centered lawyering.
Second, while attorney/client interactions are sometimes viewed either as
a minefield of potential threats to attorney neutrality and client autonomy or
as a dry and technical process of data collection, their complexity insures
that they are neither. Attorney/client interactions are, in fact, far more
exciting and fascinating-messy dialogues between two human beings whose
senses of each other and the world are fluid and dynamic. Coming to temis
with this aspect of lawyering may not only promote more effective
representation, but may also foster greater engagement in a profession that
sorely needs to counteract pervasive alienation and dissatisfaction.
Third, at least in certain contexts, an understanding that stereotypes are
internalized by lawyers and clients opens up the possibility for progressive

194. See Blasi, supra note 161, at 317 ("At bottom, lawyering entails solving (or making
worse) problems of clients and others, under conditions of extraordinary complexity and
uncertainty, in a virtually infinite range of settings. ").

31:121]

CLIENT COMPETENCE

159

social change through individual representation. 195 If attorneys come to view
the social webs and cognitive processes that define and structure meaning as
integral to practice and worthy of study, attorneys would be in a better
position to learn through clients and to help clients learn through them. This
approach offers the possibility of enriching our conception of legal
representation by emphasizing "mutual education, "196_ a process of
transformation to be experienced by both attorneys and clients.

VII. CONCLUSION
The idea of decrement constituteS an invisible premise in how both
attorneys and elderly clients view "competence." This assumption, in turn,
defines how attorneys and elderly clients view the world and each other.
This raises questions about the content of ideas like client voice and
autonomy, and attorney neutrality-foundational concepts in discourse about
attorney/client interactions. Moreover, given that the idea of decrement is
one assumption among the multitude that define how we interpret the world,
this analysis highlights the extraordinary complexity of any undertaking
through which attorneys hope to "understand" the perspective of others and,
through that understanding, to act on their behalf.
This analysis in no way delegitimizes client-centered lawyering or proves
it "wrong." To the contrary, the tendency of so many practitioners and law
students to believe that they really know what is best for the client
demonstrates the utility of a strong-albeit simplified-theory that
emphasizes the values of client perspectives. Similarly, issues of attorney
power-whether defined in terms of cultural and class distinctions especially
important in poverty law practice, or defined in terms of the power of
possessing an arcane body of knowledge not available to a layperson-argues
in favor of constant vigilance against overwhelming clients' perspectives. At
the same time, a greater recognition of the extraordinary complexity of the
lawyering enterprise holds the promise of promoting a more nuanced
conception of client perspectives while, at the same time, rendering the
process of lawyering more engaging and more transforming.

195. This perspective resonates with recent scholarship on how "power" is constituted through
individual interactions, and thus how progressive social change can (or, as some would say, must)
be sought on these individual levels. See, e.g., Steven Winter, The Power Thing, 82 VA. L. REV.
721 (1996).
196. White, supra note 99, at 743.

